Parents and Education by R.A.G. O\u27Brien
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 2 
Number 4 Volume 2, October 1956, Number 4 Article 11 
April 2016 
Parents and Education 
R.A.G. O'Brien 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Catholic Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R.A.G. O'Brien (1956) "Parents and Education," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 2 : No. 4 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol2/iss4/11 
This Reprint is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
PARENTS AND EDUCATION*
R. A. G. O'BRIENt
I HOPE I SHALL NOT BE ACCUSED Of undue nationalism if I speak at
some length of the English Common Law and consider the develop-
ments and changes occasioned by the comparatively recent establish-
ment of a compulsory and free system of education. Nor will it be
thought, I trust, that I wish to suggest that the laws of all other countries
ignore or suppress natural rights. Indeed the recent revival of natural
law theories began, I know full well, outside England, and the very fact
that certain duties and rights are recognised in all civilised countries is,
to my mind, strong corroborative evidence that those duties and rights
are part of the natural law. The ius gentium has always tended to follow
the ius naturale.1
I thought it, however, particularly appropriate to speak of the Eng-
lish Common Law in this town, which knew its chief ornament and the
origin of his best-known work-I mean the Utopia of St. Thomas More,
Saint and Martyr, the first lay, and perhaps the greatest and best-loved,
Lord Chancellor of England. Moreover, it appeared to me of advantage
to show how a system of traditional and, notwithstanding the modest
protests of the judges themselves, judge-made law, essentially Christian 2
in its origins and conceptions, and pervading its influence throughout
"Condensed and reprinted, with permission, from Parents and Education, I CATHO-
LIC EDUCATION 8 (London, 1956).
tSecretary and Solicitor to the Catholic Education Council of London, England.
I Cf. Cicero's "omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturae putanda
est." Tusc i. xiii, 30.
2 If in the case of Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd., [1917] A.C. 406, which dealt
with Charitable Trusts, and the scope of which can be exaggerated, it was held
that Christianity is no longer part of the law of England, it is clear from the judg-
ments there given that originally it was otherwise. And the Christian influence still
inevitably continues. Indeed, Lord Sumner himself said in that case: "Ours is and
always has been a Christian State. The English family is built on Christian ideals,
and if the national religion is not Christian there is none. English Law may well
be called a Christian Law, but," he added, "we apply many of its rules and most
of its principles, with equal justice and equally good government in heathen
Commun'ties, and its sanctions, even in the Courts of conscience, are material
not spiritual." Id. at 464-65.
English life, has consistently acknowledged
and supported in this vital matter those
parental rights whicl are the foundation of
voluntary education. This is a point of some
importance, as the Common Law prin-
ciples obtain throughout the British Isles,
with the exception of Scotland and the
Channel Islands, and have spread to the
Commonwealth of Nations and to the
Colonies, with exceptions such as in South
Africa and Quebec, and to the United
States of America, with the exception of
the State of Louisiana.3 Even if pecuniary
parity of position is rarely conceded, in none
of these countries is there (so far as I am
aware) a state monopoly of education.
The Common Law of England is rooted
and founded in the natural law. It would
indeed be surprising if it were otherwise,
for the Common Law, alone, I think, of all
the great systems of law was cradled in
Christianity. If Christianity takes nothing
away from nature, but rather pre-supposes
and perfects it, it might be supposed that
a law fashioned by judges who were priests
or prelates, usually learned in the Roman
and Canon Law and therefore attaching
much importance to these systems and
"perhaps even greater weight to 'natural
justice' as it was understood in their day, ' 4
would have the natural law as its founda-
3 "The law of the age that lies between 1154 and
1272 deserves patient study. These few men who
were gathered at Westminster round Patishull and
Raleigh and Bracton were penning writs that
would run (in the King's name everywhere and)
in the name of Kingless Commonwealths on the
other shore of the Atlantic Ocean. They were
making right and wrong for us and for our chil-
dren." Maitland, Pollock and .Maitland's History
of the English Law, ad finem.
4 Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law
(London, 1932), p. 17; Constitutional History of
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tion and guiding principle. And so indeed
it has happened.5
All the traditions of the formative years
in the Middle Ages were resumed by Sir
William Blackstone, a judge of the Court
of Common Pleas, when, in his well known
Commentaries on the Laws of England, he
declared:
. This law of nature, being coeval with
mankind, and dictated by God Himself, is,
of course, superior in obligation to any
other. It is binding all over the globe, in all
countries, and at all times: no human laws
are of any validity, if contrary to this; and
such of them as are valid derive all their
force and all their authority, mediately or
immediately, from this original. 6
It is not necessary to agree entirely with
Blackstone and his predecessors in describ-
ing the Common Law as the perfection of
reason, to prefer their view to those of
Bentham and his utilitarian followers, who
were legal positivists. It is, I think, sig-
nificant that Bentham attacked Blackstone,
England (Cambridge, 1909), p. 17, and Equity
(Cambridge, 1929), p. 9, both by Professor F.
W. Maitland, by common consent the greatest
and most brilliant of English legal historians. In
referring to the Common Law in this paper, I
shall speak of that law, as distinct from Statutes,
which has been formulated through the centuries
by the judges both of the Common Law (properly
so called) and Chancery Courts, since cases con-
cerning the guardianship and wardship of infants
are the proper province of the latter. Lovers of
the operas of Gilbert and Sullivan will remember
the reference by the Lord Chancellor in lolanthe
to the "pretty young wards of Chancery." Gilbert,
the librettist, was a sound lawyer.
5 See especially the publications of Richard
O'Sullivan, Q.C., e.g., in Vol. 1 of the Modern
Law Review, "Natural Law and the Common
Law," published by the Grotius Society, London,
1945; "The Inheritance of the Common Law," by
Stevens, London (1950); and numerous articles
in The London Tablet from 1940 onwards.
6 Commentaries, Introduction, s. 2.
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rejected the conception of natural law7 and
advocated a system of universal secular
state education.8 Whatever influence the
7 Cf. "The foolish criticism of Jeremy Bentham
... merely showed a contempt for a great con-
ception (i.e., the law of nature) which Bentham
had not taken the trouble to understand." The
late Professor J. L. Brierly in "The Law of Na-
tions" (Oxford, 4th ed., 1949), p. 21. I am aware
that after the attacks of the legal positivists, the
Natural Law has by no means been completely
rehabilitated and accepted. But I find it difficult
to conceive that an ideal that has endured since
classical times and the era of Confucius through-
out the Christian centuries to the present day is
entirely lacking in validity. And the widespread
and instinctive condemnation of the inhumanities
and injustices of Nazis and Communists alike
postulates a superior and more fundamental norm
by which State laws are to be judged, for on posi-
tive grounds alone all these acts of barbarism
were legally sanctioned and therefore justified.
(See, for example, "The Theology of Law," a
remarkable sermon preached at St. Dunstan's
Church, Fleet Street, London, to members of the
Bar in 1943, by Dr. Nathaniel Micklem, Principal
of Mansfield College, Oxford, and published by
Oxford University Press.) Moreover, the Uni-
versal Declaration itself presupposes an accept-
ance of some doctrine of natural law, which
underlies State law and to which the latter should
tender as to an ideal. Cf. M. Jacques Maritain in
"Autour de la Nouvelle Declaration Universelle
des Droits de l'Homme," quoted above, p. 65:
"Ils doivent cependant reconnaitre que depuis
Hippias et Alcidamas, l'histoire des droits de
l'Homme se confond avec l'histoire de la loi
naturelle, et que le discredit dans lequel le posi-
tivisme a fait tomber pour un temps l'idee de
la loi naturelle a entraine inevitablement un
pareil discredit pour l'idee des droits de l'homme."
See also "Natural Law," by Professor A. P.
d'Entreves (London, 1951), especially the last
chapter on "The Ideal Law."
8 On Blackstone and the attacks made on his com-
mentaries see, for example, two articles in Vol.
IV of the Cambridge Law Journal (1932), by
Professor Holdsworth and Professor A. V. Dicey,
pp. 261 and 286 respectively. For Bentham's edu-
cational theories, see the chapter by Dr. N. Hans
in "Pioneers of English Education," edited by
Professor A. V. Judges (Faber and Faber, Lon-
don, 1952).
Benthamites have had on legislation (some
of it undoubtedly beneficial) and on theories
of sovereignty, they did not, as I hope to
show, succeed in removing the memory of
the law of nature from the Common Law
or in preventing the Common Law from
continuing to have a proper regard for
parental rights.
At University College, Oxford, there are
three statues of which I wish to speak. Two
are in the library. They are massive, larger
than life-size and portray two brothers,
William and John Scott, though it is not
certain which statue is of which brother.
Both brothers made their name in the law.
The elder became Lord Stowell and a judge
of the Consistory and Admiralty Courts;
the other, who first went to University Col-
lege some thirteen years after Blackstone
began those lectures at Oxford which
formed the basis of his Commentaries, was,
as Lord Eldon, eventually made Lord
Chancellor. Near the main entrance of the
College there is the third statue, life-size,
delicate, beautiful, even effeminate, an ap-
propriate contrast to the other two. It is of
the poet Shelley as he was found after his
death by drowning. John Scott had a re-
spectable, if not too distinguished a career
as an undergraduate at the College. Shelley,
some forty years his junior, was sent down
from the same College because of his
atheistic views. But these two were destined
to meet at what was to prove a legal
Philippi for Shelley. After the suicide of his
wife, Harriet, in 1816, he claimed custody
of their children, who were then in the care
of her father, and the case came for trial
before Lord Eldon. Having reviewed
Shelley's past conduct and firm convictions,
Eldon declared:
I consider this as a case in which the
. 281
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father has demonstrated that he must, and
does, deem it to be a matter of duty ... to
recommend to those whose opinions and
habits he may take upon himself to form
that conduct in some of the most important
relations of life as moral and virtuous,
which the law calls upon me to consider as
immoral and vicious - conduct which the
law animadverts upon as inconsistent with
the duties of persons in such relations of life
and which it considers as injuriously affect-
ing both the interests of such persons and
those of the Community. I cannot therefore
think that I should be justified in delivering
over these children for their education ex-
clusively to what is called the care to which
Mr. Shelley wishes it to be entrusted. 9
The language may be laborious, but the
judgment is sound and is quoted as a
precedent to this day. 10
This case is, however, the exception
which proves the rule: for in general the
English Courts show the utmost reluctance
to interfere in the affairs of family life. In
a judgment delivered in noble prose just
over a hundred years later, Lord Justice
(as he then was) Atkin said:
The Common Law does not regulate the
form of agreement between spouses. Their
promises are not sealed with seals of sealing
wax. The consideration that really obtains
for them is that natural love and affection
which counts for so little in these cold
courts.... In respect of their promises each
house is a domain into which the King's
Writ does not seek to run and to which his
officers do not seek to be admitted."1
The saying that an Englishman's home is
his castle is not mere rhetoric: it has its
justification in the Common Law.
The earliest cases in which the relations
between parents and their children were
9 Shelley v. Westbrooke (1817), Jac. 266.
10 Cf. for example Halsbury's Laws of England
(2d ed.), Vol. XVII, pp. 661, 669.
11 Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571.
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considered seem, so far as I have been able
to discover, those concerned with guardian-
ship. There was guardianship by nature,
which, of course, was held to belong to the
parents exclusively, and guardianship-in
the Norman French of the medieval law-
per cause de norture, or guardianship for
the purpose of maintenance, which, it was
decided by Mr. Justice Danby in the reign
of Edward IV, could not be claimed by a
stranger. 12 In addition there were various
guardianships depending on feudal tenures
of land, but these do not concern us here.' 3
The words by nature and nurture, however,
will be met with again, and it was in ac-
cordance with the principles established by
the Common Law that a statute passed in
the reign of Queen Mary proscribed the
taking away or marrying of maidens under
12 8 Edw. IV, p. 7, Mich., p. 2 (1468)-a note by
Danby, J., and others-"mes un estranger ne poit
justifier le pris d'un enfant per reason de norture.
Mes guardeine per reason de norture poit bail
1'enfant a un nome pur enforme et erudire car ii
n'est forsque come son depretie de garder l'enfant
et it poit reprend luy quant it voit." Even a con-
trary opinion on the particular point at issue
conceded: "Si jeo ay forsque un charge per le
gard, cestassavoir ad informandum et erudiendum,
etc., la poet reprend." Cf. also 33 Henry VI, Mich.
pl. 49 (1454): where it is noted by Littleton, J.,
that the parental right can be maintained even
where the King is the feudal superior: "le pere
aura le gard et mariage de son filz et file et heir
en chelcun cas nonobstant qe la tere soit tend del
Roy ou de quicunque autre." In referring to this
case Viner's Abridgment (1754) notes: "the
father has the wardship of his son, jure naturae."
14 Viner, p. 162. In Christopher St. German's
"Doctor and Student" (1523/28) it is stated:
"Within the homestead, the father will undertake
the rule of the family and the education of the
children."
13 See Sir Edward Coke's (early seventeenth-
century) commentary on Littleton's Tenures (Co.
Litt. 88b), and also Notes 12 and 13 by Hargreaves
(c. 1745), and 14 Viner, p. 171, and Blackstone's
Commentaries, Vol. 1, Chap. XVII.
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sixteen against the consent of their parents.
This statutory prohibition was "in terms
which implied that the custody and educa-
tion of such females should belong to the
father and the mother, or the person ap-
pointed by the former." 14
Blackstone classified the duties of parents
under the trinity of maintenance, protection
and education. Of the first two of these
duties, he wrote:
The duty of parents to provide for the
maintenance of their children is a principle
of natural law; an obligation laid on them
not only by nature herself, but by their own
proper act in bringing them into the world;
for they would be in the highest manner
injurious to their issue, if they only gave
their children life, that they might after-
wards see them perish. . . . And thus the
children will have a perfect right of receiv-
ing maintenance from their parents .... From
the duty of maintenance we may easily pass
to that of protection, which is also a natural
duty, but, rather permitted than enjoined by
any municipal laws; nature, in this respect,
working so strongly as to need rather a
check than a spur.
"The last duty of parents," Blackstone
wrote, "is that of giving [their children]
education suitable to their station in life;
a duty pointed out by reason, and of far
the greatest importance of any."15
The Common Law, in recognising these
parental duties, has also acknowledged the
rights which are their consequence, and has
therefore always been most reluctant to in-
terfere with the acts of a father as the natural
guardian of his children, and especially with
his decision on their education and more
particularly their religious education. Vice-
14 Statute 4 and 5 Ph. and M., and see Co. Litt.
88b, Note 14 by Hargreaves.
15 Commentaries, Vol. 1, Chap. XVI.
Chancellor Bacon in 1882 did not hesitate
to describe as sacred these paternal rights
and to say that the principle of non-inter-
ference was one of those principles of law
"which have been settled for centuries." 16
A year later, Lord Justice Bowen gave the
reason for this well established principle:
The court must not be tempted to inter-
fere with the natural order and course of
family life, the very basis of which is the
authority of the father, except it be in those
very special cases in which the State is called
upon, for reasons of urgency, to set aside
the parental authority and to intervene for
itself.... To neglect the natural jurisdiction
of the father over the child until the age
of twenty-one would be to set aside the
whole course and order of nature.., and
would disturb the very foundation of family
life. 17
In conceding this plenitude of power to
a father, however, these very Victorian
judges by no means expected him to play
the role of a Mr. Barrett of Wimpole Street,
for in the same case the Master of the Rolls,
Sir William Brett, declared that:
[t]he natural duties of a father are to treat
his child with the utmost affection and with
infinite tenderness, to forgive his child with-
out stint and under all circumstances....
They are the natural duties of a father,
which, if he breaks, he breaks from all that
nature calls upon him to do.... The law
16 Re Plomley, 47 L. T. (N.S.) 284.
17 Re Agar Ellis (1883), 24 Ch. D. 317, pp. 335,
336. When this case first came before the Courts
a few years previously it was decided that the
ante-nuptial promise required by Canon 1061 of
the Canon Law for a "coniunx acatholicus" was
not legally binding on a father so far as the edu-
cation of his children was concerned: see (1878),
10 Ch. D. 49. In re Clarke (1882), 21 Ch. D. 317,
it was held that such an ante-nuptial promise
could be considered a rebuttable evidence of a
father's wishes in this matter.
does not interfere because of the great trust
and faith it has in the natural affection of
the father to perform his duties and there-
fore gives him corresponding rights.' 8
It has been decided that a father cannot
renounce his right to determine how his
child should be educated, because of the
duty he owes to consider the child's true
benefit. "It is not," Lord Justice Bowen
again said, with a humility which it would
be hard to parallel among politicians and
administrators, "the benefit of the infant as
conceived by the Court, but it must be the
-benefit of the infant having regard to the
natural law, which points out that the father
knows far better as a rule what is good for
his children than a Court of Justice can." 19
A father can, of course, lose his rights by
abandonment 20 or, as has been seen in
Shelley's Case, by abuse. If he is incapable
or unwilling to perform his duties or de-
clines to fulfill them properly, he cannot
claim his rights. The Courts will then-
though with considerable hesitation-decide
what they think best in the interests of the
children. But they will certainly not permit
strangers to do what they themselves have
abstained from doing; they will not sanction
either the enticement of immature children,
under religious or other strong influence,
from their homes,2 1 or any provision in a
will or settlement of property whereby a
parent might be seduced by financial or
other worldly temptations from doing what
he honestly thought to be the best for his
children; for, as was said by a judge some
twenty years ago:
18 Re Agar Ellis (1883), 24 Ch. D. 327.
19 Id. at 337.
20 Re Newton (Infants) [1896] 1 Ch. 740; Ward
v. Laverty [1925] A.C. (Ir.) 101.
21 Lough v. Ward (1945), 1 All E.R. 338.
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Infants are, or ought to be, instructed in
religious matters by their parents. The
parents' duty is to be discharged solely with
a view to the moral and spiritual welfare
of their children, and ought not to be influ-
enced by mercenary considerations affecting
the infants' worldly welfare.... In my judg-
ment, this condition is void because it oper-
ates to restrain a man from doing his duty. 22
So far I have spoken only of the rights
of a father. In less sophisticated days hus-
band and wife were regarded as one in law,
and the husband as that one. In more recent
times the emphasis has been changed. By
the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, the
Courts are bidden, in deciding any question
on the custody or upbringing of an infant,
to regard the welfare of the infant as the
first and paramount consideration and the
claim of neither parent is to be considered
as superior to that of the other. But it has
recently been stated by the Privy Council
that this Act "merely enacted the rule which
has long been acted on in the Chancery
Division of the High Court of Justice,"? 3
for, as was said in an Irish case: "when a
parent is of blameless life and is able and
willing to provide for the child's material
and moral necessities the Court is, in my
opinion, judicially bound to act on what is
equally the law of nature and of society and
to hold. .. that the 'best place for a child
22 Bennett, J., in Re Borwick [1933] 1 Ch. 657. The
condition was so drafted as partially to defeat the
interest of a grandchild if he should "at any time
before attaining a vested interest... be or be-
come a Roman Catholic or not be openly or
avowedly a Protestant."
23 McKee v. McKee, an appeal from the Supreme
Court of Canada, (1951] 1 All E.R., p. 949. In
this case it was also said: "It is the law of Ontario
(as it is the law of England) that the welfare and
happiness of the infant is the paramount con-
sideration in questions of custody ... so also it
is the law of Scotland and of most, if not all, of
the States of the United States of America."
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is with its parent'."' 24 Parents still have
their "immemorial rights by nature and
nurture," and it is only when they disagree
that the Courts consider in the first place
the true welfare of the child. And since the
Act, it has been decided in a case where
for the first time, at least since the Refor-
mation, St. Thomas Aquinas has been
quoted by a Judge as persuasive authority,
that it is the mother of an illegitimate child
who has the right to determine its educa-
tion, even against those who may have
actual custody of it.25
It may also be mentioned that a teacher
has always been considered by the Com-
mon Law as standing in loco parentis and
therefore as being, in a real sense, the
24 Re O'Hara [1900] 2 I.R. 232, p. 240, and see
Re Thain [1926] Ch. 676. A father is still the
natural guardian of his children. "Subject to the
first and paramount consideration of the infant's
welfare, a father has a natural jurisdiction over,
and a right to the custody of, his child during
infancy, except that in the case of a daughter the
right determines on her marriage under age."
Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed.), Vol.
XVII, para. 1378.
25 Re Carrol [1931] 1 K.B. 317 (C.A.), and
especially the judgment of Slesser, L.J. See also
Re K. [1952] 2 All E.R. 377-a case when it was
held not unreasonable for a mother, whose life
was not quite of the highest degree of sanctity, to
refuse her consent to the adoption of the child
by foster parents to whom she had committed it.
But cf. Re Collins [1950] 1 All E.R. 1057, where
the effect of the Guardianship of Children Act,
1925, in the case of an orphan was considered
and Re A. [1955] 2 All E.R. 202, where it was held
by the Court of Appeal that as between the mother
of an illegitimate child and the natural father, the
paramount (but not exclusive) consideration was
the welfare of the child. It was too wide to submit
that "the natural mother... has the right to
choose who will bring (the child) up, unless...
there emerged prevailing considerations of essen-
tial importance to the child" or "unless the mother
was shown to be in some way irresponsible or
wicked."
parents' agent--certainly so far as the ad-
ministration of punishment and the care to
be taken of children are concerned. In every
such case the standard by which the con-
duct of the teacher is judged is that of a
reasonable, prudent parent.26
The cases that have been considered have
dealt with questions of guardianship and
custody and by whom and how the duty
to educate should be exercised. The Com-
mon Law made no attempt to enforce that
duty. But statutes have abundantly supplied
the omission of which Blackstone com-
plained in his day, saying "the municipal
laws of most countries seem to be defective
in this point, by not constraining the parent
to bestow a proper education upon his chil-
dren."' 2 7 Before attention is devoted to the
English Education Acts of modern times,
it is worthwhile noticing that as early as
1406 a statute provided, in conformity with
the principles of the Common Law, that
every man or woman, regardless of situation
in life, was free to send his or her son or
daughter to any school in the realm he or
she pleased. This declaration of parents'
freedom of choice is remarkable in an era
when compulsory education had not yet
come to make necessary the development
of a precise theory of parental rights, but
when in any event education depended so
much on parental initiative and personal
talent, whether in the case of a Nicholas
Breakspear or an Erasmus.
26 See, for example, Williams v. Eady (1893), 10
T.L.R. 41; Shepherd v. Essex County Council
(1913), 29 T.L.R. 303, and Ryan v. Fildes [1938]
3 All E.R. 517; Ralph v. London County Council
(1947), 63 T.L.R. 546, and Rich v. London
County Council [1953] 2 All E.R. 376, and paras.
1241, 1242 in Vol. 13 of Halsbury's Laws of
England (3d ed.).
27 Op. cit. Vol. 1, Chap. XVI.
The Nonconformist Members of Parlia-
ment, who forced Gladstone in the course
of a week to change the Education Bill of
1870 to the form it eventually took when it
became law, were, I believe, properly fight-
ing for the natural rights of parents since
they feared that the original proposals
would force Nonconformist children to be
sent to Church of England Schools. 28 But
the solution reached was unfortunate, as the
Act provided for the establishment of State
elementary schools in which "no catechism
or religious formulary which is distinctive
of any particular denomination" might be
given. 29 Undenominational schools were
previously a rare species in the educational
system of the British Isles; as will have
been noticed, undenominational instruction
was foreign to the notions of the Common
Law; but by a cruel irony the successful
Parliamentary struggle based on parental
rights had the practical result of denying
similar rights to parents who conscien-
tiously desired a denominational education
for their children, more especially after
1880 when education was made compul-
sory. The injustice was recognized im-
plicitly but clearly by Gladstone himself 30
28 See "The Cowper-Temple Clause" reprinted
from the Catholic Times and appearing in "The
Case for Catholic Schools," published by the
Catholic Education Council for England and
Wales (London, 1955, 2d ed.).
29 Section 14 of the Education Act, 1870.
30 In the Committee Stage of the 1870 Bill he
stated: "We may either forbid or compel a Local
Board to aid voluntary schools; but if we forbid
them, and make them leave voluntary schools (as
they are) dependent upon the modicum of aid
which they now obtain from the Privy Council,
that would not be consistent with the view with
which this Bill was brought forward, and it would
not fulfill the engagement under which, all along,
we have admitted ourselves to lie-namely, that
of giving fair terms to voluntary schools." A recent
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and quite explicitly by W. E. Forster, the
father of the 1870 Act. "There are im-
portant minorities who very much prefer
catechism and formularies," the latter ad-
mitted, "... when we take their money to
support schools they do not approve of,
we should give them some equivalent...
we are bound to give them back that edu-
cation for which we made them pay."' 31 But
the immense premium put on the State un-
denominational schools has been retained
until the present day. In counting our bless-
ings we can be grateful that voluntary
schools have, in spite of many administra-
tive inconveniences, been incorporated in,
and indeed form an essential part of, the
present State system of Education and that
successive breaches have been made in the
principles underlying the Act of 1870, from
1902, when Local Education Authorities
were first made responsible for the running
costs of voluntary schools, to the present
time when the scope of such maintenance
has been enlarged and new voluntary
schools may in certain circumstances qualify
for building grants from the State. 32 On
the other hand, the sums which have to be
biographer of Disraeli, the leader of the Tory
opposition at the time, has written: "Apart from
this Irish legislation, Gladstone's main achieve-
ment during the 1869-70 sessions was the Educa-
tion Act ... Disraeli's Government had also done
something along these lines, and he did not oppose
Gladstone's Bill except to criticise the undenomi-
national nature of religious teaching in the
schools, the dogmas of the schoolmaster being
substituted for those of the priest." Hesketh
Pearson's "Dizzy," p. 184.
31 Hansard CCII, 592.
32 On maintenance, see the Education Act, 1944,
s. 114 (2) and s. 15 (3) as amended by the Edu-
cation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1946. On
capital grants, see the Education Act, 1944, ss.
102 (as amended by the 1946 Act), 103 and 104,
and Sched. III; the Act of 1946, s. 3, and Sched. I;
and the Act of 1953, ss. 1 and 8.
PARENTS AND EDUCATION
paid by those who support such schools
for conscience' sake have also increased
beyond all expectation.3 3 The soundness of
the plea that there should be pecuniary
parity of position between State and volun-
tary schools has been acknowledged in
many and often unexpected quarters from
the late George Bernard Shaw in 1902,34
to an impressive statement issued in 1943
by a number of distinguished education-
ists, 35 set up as an Education Committee
by the Nuffield College Social Reconstruc-
tion Survey; and Mr. R. A. Butler admitted
in a frank and revealing sentence that, to
avoid alienating the Local Education Au-
thorities, the Free Churches and the Teach-
ers, he had not been able "to concede the
full demands of those who desire complete
liberty of conscience." 36
It is at least something that the Butler
Act made it obligatory in all schools main-
33 See generally "The Case for Catholic Schools,"
mentioned above.
34 ".... Mr. Bernard Shaw put the matter with
characteristic incisiveness when he broke a lance
with Dr. Clifford in the columns of the Daily
News: 'For my part I say that as long as there is
a school in England to which children practically
must go, either because their parents choose to
send them there or for want of a better one in the
neighbourhood, that school should be placed
under the Education Department and fully fi-
nanced by the State, whether it be Established
Church, Nonconformist, Roman Catholic, Posi-
tivist or Parsee'." From "Sir Robert Morant, a
Great Public Servant," by Bernard M. Allen,
M.A., LL.D. (London, 1934), p. 199.
35 "Religious Education," a statement published
by Nuffield College (Oxford University Press,
1943). See also the quotations given by A. C. F.
Beales in his chapter on "The Future of Voluntary
Schools" in "Looking Forward in Education,"
edited by Professor A. V. Judges (Faber and
Faber, 1955). p. 104.
36 During the debate on 30th July, 1943, in the
House of Commons on the White Paper entitled
"Educational Reconstruction."
tained by Local Education Authorities for
each school day to start with a corporate
act of worship and for religious instruction
to be given,3 7 because, in the words of the
Board of Education's introductory Mem-
orandum:
[Tihere has been a very general wish, not
confined to representatives of the Churches,
that religious education should be given a
more defined place in the life and work of
the schools.... The Church, the family, the
local community and the teacher-all have
their part to play in imparting religious in-
struction to the young. 38
But for the most part this instruction must
be in accordance with the "religion" of the
Agreed Syllabus.3 9 Since these syllabi must
be strictly undenominational, 40 and are
drawn up by agreement between parties
with very different views, they will repre-
sent a minimum and not a maximum of
belief. While it is not, I think, necessary
to agree that "watered down Christianity
is almost worse than no Christianity at
all," 4 1 it is just to hold that the Agreed
Syllabus is not adequate for the crisis of
this age. In a remarkable passage the Min-
istry of Education has diagnosed our
malaise:
The many people-indeed some who
call themselves Christians -behave as
though truth and falsehood were one, and
as though gain and pleasure were the real
and legitimate springs of action. In modern
jargon, this is our moral Fifth Column. At
the same time, the citadel is threatened by
37 Education Act, 1944, s. 25. It is also pertinent
to note the scope of the duty put upon Local
Education Authorities by s. 7.
38 "Educational Reconstruction" (Cmd. 6458),
para. 36. Cf. also "Religious Education in Eng-
land, Past, Present and Future," by A. C. F.
Beales, published by the Sword of the Spirit
(London, 1943).
39 Education Act, ss. 26 and 27, and cf. s. 28.
40 Ibid. s. 26.
41 R. A. L. Smith, op. cit., p. 81.
frontal assault. Over large areas of the world
the gospel of force is now preached, as it
was in Germany before and during the war,
with all the weapons of science and propa-
ganda, all the panoply of a Crusade. These
evil gospels ... can only be met by faith as
positive and confident as their own. A social
conscience, unsupported by religious con-
viction, has not always the strength to de-
fend itself against organised evil. If homes
and schools and society at large are with-
out spiritual ideals, they are houses built on
the sand and cannot be relied on to stand
against the rising storm.4 2
Professor M. C. V. Jeffreys has expres-
sively diagnosed the malady which is sap-
ping our educational system and indeed
undermining our civilisation, in saying,
"What we have done is to shift the prin-
ciple of laissez-faire from the economic
sphere to the moral sphere. But it is hard
to see on what ground we can expect it to
work better in the one sphere than in the
other."'4 3 In this matter the Communists are
wiser in their generation than so many of
the heirs to Western civilisation. What is
really needed is teaching, strong, positive
and doctrinal, leading to a life grounded in
faith, hope and charity. 44 The basis can
best be laid in the home, 45 but much can
be done in school to foster or mar what
good the parents have achieved, precisely
42 "Citizens Growing Up," Part 1, s. 4. See also
"Religious Education in Schools" (S.P.C.K.,
1955), and A. C. F. Beales, in "Looking Forward
in Education," pp. 99 et seq.
43 op. cit. p. 8.
44 Cf. the statement of the Right Reverend Dr.
Walter Carey, formerly Anglican Bishop of
Bloemfontein, in Lumen Vitae, Vol. V, 1950,
No. 1, pp. 141 and 142, and "Citizens of To-
morrow," a report published by the King George
Jubilee Trust (London, 1955), pp. 27-29, 41-46,
99, 124, 125, 129 and 130, and Chap. 11 of Pro-
fessor M. V. C. Jeffreys, op. cit.
45 Cf. "Citizens Growing Up," Pt. l, s. 3.
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in the measure that the school is regarded
as an'extension or instrument of parental
duties and rights. If, as has been candidly
said by the Deputy-Principal of Didsbury
Training College, Manchester, Miss Phyllis
Doyle: "The roots of the moral life of a
community are buried in the home; and
the homes of today in England are well
on the way to disintegration... . The Eng-
lishman... is in a 'far country,' where 'no
man giveth him to eat' for there is little or
no systematic moral training for the mass
of the population," 46 the converse is also
true. In so far as homes are religious, in the
best sense of that often-misused word, they
are more likely to give a sound moral train-
ing, and in so far as the schools continue
that training on the same religious founda-
tion the children that come out of them will
feel less morally homeless and hungry. The
infelix culpa, however, is that when parents
care about these problems, take the trouble
to choose a school where the instruction, the
outlook of the teachers and the whole at-
mosphere shall be in harmony with the edu-
cation, the outlook and the atmosphere of
the home, 4 7 and hence choose voluntary
schools for their children, those schools, in-
stead of being put on a par with the State
schools, are usually treated, in the words
of one of our great educationists, the late
Sir Michael Sadler, as "something unhealthy
which merits a fine."
The Act of 1944 certainly provides
46 Article on Religion and Morals in England in
the Year Book of Education, 1951, p. 311.
47 In para. 47 of a pamphlet issued by the Min-
istry of Education in 1946 and entitled "Special
Educational Treatment," disharmony between
school and home is listed as one of the more
common causes of what is termed, in modern
jargon, "educational retardation." Cf. Dr. W. D.
Wall's "Education and Mental Health," quoted
above.
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statutory sanction for parental duties. By
Section 36, in words which it would be
difficult to draft better, the duty is imposed
on "the parent of every child of compulsory
school age to cause him to receive efficient
full-time education suitable to his age,
ability and aptitude, either by regular at-
tendance at school or otherwise." 48 Section
39 makes it a criminal offence on the part
of the parent if a child of compulsory school
age fails, subject to certain exceptions, to
attend regularly at the school at which he
or she is registered. Provisions for the en-
forcement of these sections are contained
in Section 37 (as amended by the Education
Act of 1953), Section 39 and Section 40,
and the Courts have shown themselves strict
in their interpretation of these provisions.
49
As a necessary corollary, education is
free in all schools, whether State or volun-
tary, maintained by the Local Education
Authorities. 50
48 To fulfil this legal obligation it is not obligatory
to pass children through the State system of
education or even to send them to school at all,
if the parents can teach them efficiently them-
selves, as many do, or by means of tutors.
49 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Howells [1949] 1 All E.R.
942 and Spiers v. Warrington Corporation-the
"slacks" case-[1953] 2 All E.R. 1052.
50 Section 61. On the right to free education being
a corollary of compulsory education, see Lord
Justice Swinfen-Eady in Gateshead Union v. Dur-
ham County Council [1918] 1 Ch. 146: "1 am of
opinion that the Acts which require a parent to
cause his children to attend school give him the
right to comply with their provisions and enable
him to insist that the child which he tenders shall
be permitted to 'attend' school ... He is entitled
to free education for his child-that is education
without making any payment whatever... If a
parent has a legal right to free education for his
child at a public elementary school, the Board
of Education cannot, nor can the Local Education
Authority, take it away." There seems, however,
to be a serious lacuna in the Education Act, 1944.
Section 8. deals with the provision by a Local
The statutory support for parental rights,
on which the whole case for voluntary
schools is ultimately founded, is, however,
much less satisfactory. In response to press-
ing requests, Mr. R. A. Butler inserted into
the Education Bill of 1943 a general dec-
laration of parental rights. This declara-
tion was originally part of what is now
Section 8 of the 1944 Act dealing with the
provision of schools by Local Education
Authorities, and its wording was adapted
from that of Section 19 of the Education
Act, .1921.51 When the Bill came to the
House of Lords, the declaration was moved
to Part IV of the Act and eventually be-
came Section 76, to make it clear that it
should have a general application and
should not merely be confined to issues
about the provision of schools. This Section
reads as follows:
In the exercise and performance of all
powers and duties conferred and imposed
on them by this Act, the Minister and Local
Education Authorities shall have regard to
the general principles that, so far as is com-
patible with the provision of efficient in-
struction and training and the avoidance of
unreasonable public expenditure, pupils are
to be educated in accordance with the wishes
of their parents.
All those who supported the cause of
voluntary and independent schools wel-
comed and relied on Section 76, not only
Education Authority of sufficient schools for the
children of their area, but there is no mention
specifically of maintained schools; and it is only
in maintained schools that by s. 61 no fees may
be charged.
51 For the parliamentary history of the clause, see
Hansard for the House of Commons for 19th and
20th January, 1944 (and especially cols. 427-429
of the latter issue), 15th February, 1944 (cols.
138 et seq.), the House of Lords Official Report
for I 1th July, 1944 (col. 774), and 12th July,
1944 (col. 864), and Hansard for the House of
Commons for 27th July, 1944 (col. 968).
as being in effect a statutory summary of
the doctrine of the Common Law on par-
ental rights, but also as a safeguard against
the possibility of the voluntary and inde-
pendent schools being administered out of
existence through parents' wishes being
ignored. It will not, I think, be denied that
it was the genuine intention of the Legis-
lature to afford a reasonable and legally
effective guarantee to parents. Difficulties,
however, soon arose in the application of
Section 76 to specific cases, and the Minister
of Education therefore issued memoranda
of advice which culminated in the Manual
of Guidance on the choice of schools, of
1950. This Manual, with its carefully bal-
anced recommendations on how the Min-
ister thought that the Section ought to be
administered, satisfied neither the Local
Education Authorities nor the parents who
preferred claims against them. The case of
Watt v. Kesteven County Council52 has at
least provided a judicial interpretation of
Section 76, even if that interpretation has
to all intents and purposes knocked away
the prop on which parents and their cham-
pions expected they could rely.
In that case, which was the strongest that
could be found in favour of parents, it was
argued that since the conditions about the
provision of efficient instruction and the
avoidance of unreasonable public expendi-
ture were admittedly fulfilled-the schools
chosen by Mr. Watt were recognised by the
Ministry of Education as efficient and the
payments of school fees which he claimed
were less than those which the County
Council were prepared to pay at the school
of their choice-the Council, as Local Edu-
52 [1955] 1 Q.B. 408, 416; [1954] 3 All E.R. 441;
[1955] 1 All E.R. 473: For a detailed account of
this case, see Catholic Times, 7th April, 1955.
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cation Authority, were bound by the terms
of the section to comply with Mr. Watt's
parental wishes. Mr. Justice Ormerod and
the Court of Appeal, however, held that the
section did not impose so stringent a duty
on the authorities, for in the words of Lord
Justice Denning:
It was said that, when there was no main-
tained or grant-aided school, the County
Council had a duty under Section 8 to make
available an independent school and to pay
the fees in full: and that, in exercising that
duty, they were bound under Section 76 to
have regard to the general principle that
pupils were to be educated in accordance
with the wishes of their parents. Hence, if
there are two independent schools, one in
Stamford and the other far away, both of
which are efficient and charge the same tui-
tion fees, the pupils should be educated at
the one chosen by the parents ... I think
that argument is mistaken .... Section 76
does not say that pupils must in all cases be
educated in accordance with the wishes of
their parents. It lays down a general prin-
ciple to which the County Council must
have regard. This leaves it open to the
County Council to have regard to other
things as well, and also to make exceptions
to the general principle if it thinks fit to
do so. It cannot, therefore, be said that a
County Council is at fault simply because
it does not see fit to comply with the parents'
wishes.
The only statutory right which parents
possess, therefore, is to have their wishes
noticed, however cursorily or fleetingly, by
the Minister or Local Education Authority,
and they cannot be heard to complain in
the Courts if those wishes are subsequently
ignored. As The Times Educational. Sup-
plement said of the effect of this case, in
the issue of llth February, 1955:
Administrators must be rubbing their
hands with satisfaction. How much easier
to arrange for the children's education if
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their parents' tiresome prejudices can be
safely discounted. Yet is it a vain hope that
there are enough authorities with sufficient
understanding of the nature of their work
and of the spirit of the Act to ensure by
their administrative decisions that Section
76 does not become a mere embellishment
of the Act, looking nice and signifying
nothing?
The previous Common Law decisions on
the parents' rights to control the upbring-
ing and education of their children, of
course, remain unaffected. As against the
interference or enticements of third parties,
the Courts will continue to support the
parents. The latter will have no problem
if they can afford to educate their children
as they think best; but, where any issue
arises under the Education Acts, a parent
is entirely subject to the discretion of the
Minister and the Local Education Au-
thority, even when his wishes cannot be
said to involve any inefficiency of instruc-
tion or unreasonableness in public expendi-
ture. If a settlor wants to give money to
someone else's children on condition that
these children are brought up in a certain
manner, the Courts will hold that condition
void as being an unwarranted interference
with the parents' duties and rights; but if
a Local Education Authority will only dis-
pense the benefits of the Education Acts on
condition that the children to be benefited
are educated in the way the Authority
deems most suitable, the Courts have de-
cided that the parent has no legal ground
for complaint. Indeed, teachers have more
precise and effective safeguards under the
Acts for their rights of conscience than have
parents. 53
In order to provide a secure juridical
basis for the natural rights of parents and
53 See s. 30 of the Education Act, 1944.
for the continued existence and develop-
ment of the voluntary schools in this
county, Section 76 ought to be amended
to impose an indisputable obligation on the
Minister and the Local Education Authori-
ties to comply with the wishes of parents
in regard to the education of their children,
so long as those wishes are compatible with
the provision of efficient instruction and
training and the avoidance of unreasonable
public expenditure. It is only then that
parents will be enabled to go up higher
and occupy their rightful place in the edu-
cational hierarchy ...
I have mentioned the spread of the Eng-
lish Common Law to the United States. The
American Declaration of Independence
justified the revolt from the English Crown
by an appeal to "the Laws of Nature and
of Nature's God." And it was in faithful
pursuance of the Common Law that in 1925
the Supreme Court of the United States, in
a judgment which was subsequently, as it
were, canonized, by being quoted with ap-
proval by Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical
Divini Illius Magistri, 54 declared compul-
sory public (State) school machinery un-
constitutional for the reason that "the child
is not the mere creature of the State: those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional
duties."' 55 This decision remains, I believe,
valid, notwithstanding the recent much dis-
puted judgments given by the same Court
and based on the interpretation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Amer-
ican Constitution. 56 As in this country, a
54 Paragraph 42.
55 The Oregon School Case: Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
56 See, for example, Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McCollum v. Board of
distinction seems to be drawn between
direct compulsion to have a child educated
contrary to his parents' wishes and the right
of parents, even once compulsory educa-
tion has been imposed, to claim assistance
from public funds when they want for their
children an education other than that given
in the State schools.
It has, however, been left, I think, to
Eire, to exhibit the most felicitous issue of
a happy and harmonious union between the
Natural and Common Laws. 1 venture to
quote in full Article 42 of the present Irish
Constitution as it resumes so admirably all
that I have attempted to say:
The State acknowledges that the primary
and natural educator of the child is the
Family, and guarantees to respect the in-
violable right and duty of parents to pro-
vide, according to their means, for the
religious and moral, intellectual and physi-
cal and social education of their children.
Parents shall be free to provide this edu-
cation in their homes or in private schools
or in schools recognised or established by
the State.
The State shall not oblige parents in vio-
lation of their conscience and lawful pref-
Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 305 (1952); and James M.
O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Con-
stitution (New York, Harper Bros., 1949); the
Reverend B. B. Rooney, S.J., "The Relation of
Religion to Public Education in the United States,"
in Lumen Vitae, Vol. V, 1950, No. 1, p. 80 et seq.;
Thomas H. Mahony, LL.B., "The State and Re-
ligion for the Past Fifty Years," in the Catholic
School Journal (published by the Bruce Publish-
ing Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin), for April, 1951
(Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 134-137); George E. Reid,
LL.M., "Church-State and the Zorach Case," in
Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 72, p. 529 et seq., and
"Liberty, the State and the School" and "Religious
Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," in The Catholic Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
(October, 1955), published by the St. Thomas
More Institute for Legal Research of St. John's
University School of Law, New York.
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erence to send their children to schools
established by the State, or to any particular
type of schools designated by the State.
The State shall, however, as guardian of
the common good, require in view of actual
conditions that the children shall receive a
certain minimum education, moral, intel-
lectual and social.
The State shall provide for free primary
education and shall endeavour to supple-
ment and give reasonable aid to private and
corporate educational initiative, and, when
the public good requires it, provide other
educational facilities or institutions, with
due regard, however, for the rights of par-
ents, especially in the matter of religious
and moral formation.
In exceptional cases, where the parents
for physical or moral reasons fail in their
duty towards their children, the State, as
guardian of the common good, by appro-
priate means shall endeavor to supply the
place of the parents, but always with due
regard for the natural and imprescriptible
rights of the child.57
The cause of voluntary education has
often been represented as obscurantist, re-
trograde and unpatriotic. But it is not a
sign of progress nor in the best interests of
a free community or of sound education to
suppress what is natural. Happily this is
coming more and more to be realized. What
is now necessary is that international and
national guarantees of parental rights should
not remain in the realm of pious ejacula-
tions. 58 They must not be allowed to be-
57 Cf. also Art. 44: "Legislation providing State
aid for schools shall not discriminate between
schools under the management of different re-
ligious denominations, nor be such as to affect
prejudicially the right of any child to attend a
school receiving public money without attending
religious instruction at that school .. "
58 For an article on the subject of the Universal
Declaration having no legal binding force, see
Professor H. Lauterpacht in the British Year Book
of International Law (1948), Vol. XXV, p. 354
et seq.
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come declarations which are rendered
hollow and hypocritical because of eco-
nomic or administrative pressure on the
part of the State and its organs. In the effort
to make parental rights actual it can be
shown that voluntary education is no mere
unpractical ideal, but has everything to
recommend it, whether the stand be taken
on grounds of religion or natural law, on
educational theory or child psychology, on
the professional integrity of teachers, or
where it is most often and most heavily
attacked, on politics. For, as a distinguished
historian has warned, "in proportion as
education becomes controlled by the State,
it will become nationalised or, in extreme
cases, the servant of a political party. The
last alternative still strikes us here in Eng-
land as outrageous; but it is not only essen-
tial to the totalitarian State, it existed be-
fore the rise of totalitarianism and to a
great extent created it, and it is present as
a tendency in all modern societies, however
opposed they are to totalitarianism in its
overt form."'59 The struggle for voluntary
59 Christopher Dawson, Fellow of the British
Academy, in "The Study of Christian Culture as
education, which is still to be won in so
many countries, is a struggle for freedom. 60
It is even more a sacred struggle because
it is fundamentally a fight for the minds and
souls of children and for the salvation, tem-
poral and eternal, of families and of future
generations. It is a struggle which can
already claim its modern martyrs beyond
the Iron Curtain; and their sufferings shall
not be in vain.
a Means of Education," in Lumen Vitae, Vol. V,
1950, No. 1, p. 72. Cf. Lecky, quoted by Christo-
pher Hollis in The London Tablet for 22nd Au-
gust, 1953: "The more dangerous forms of ani-
mosity and dissension are usually undiminished,
and are often stimulated, by its (education's) in-
fluence. An immense proportion of those who
have learnt to read, never read anything but a
party newspaper - very probably a newspaper
specially intended to influence or mislead them -
and the half-educated mind is peculiarly open to
political Utopias and fanaticism," and the speech
by Professor Guido Gonella on La Liberth della
scuola e le Libertt Democratiche, reported in
Scuola Libera, Anno IX, No. 3-4 (July-Decem-
ber, 1955).
60 For a statement of the issues in England and
Wales, see A. C. F. Beales in "Looking Forward
in Education," quoted above.
